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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
-vs-
KEITH S. BROOKS, 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with a violation of Section 
76-7-302, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), to wit: 
aggravated robbery. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried by a jury before the Honorable 
Thornley K. Swan of the Second Judicial District, State 
of Utah, and found guilty as charged. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the conviction. 
Case No. 
14539 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the twenty-first of June, 1975, at approxirsately 
10:30 p.m., appellant entered the Circle K Food Store 
in Bountiful, Utah. The proprietor, Barry Godw" 
behind the counter. Appellant pulled out a 
style hand gun and demanded money (T-35,36). 
Godwin complied and appellant turned to go. As 
left the store, appellant walked past a Gary Brow 
was entering the store to make a purchase (T-9 6) . 
On the day following the robbery both of the 
witnesses were shown, separately, six i:mug-shotsfl of 
black individuals and were asked to see if one was the 
robber. Both men picked out the picture of appellant 
and said they were sure (T-20,98). 
At trial appellant called, as an alibi witness, 
his girlfriend who testified that appellant was with 
her in Ogden at the time of the robbery. Also appellant 
called another women, a checker in a store in Ogden, to 
testify that appellant made a purchase at the store at 
the time of the robbery. On cross-examination however, 
this second alibi witness stated that shortly before 
trial several of appellant's friends accosted her and 
threatened her if she did not help apoellant (T-260). 
~2~ 
At trial, during voir dire of the jury two 
prospective jurors testified that they knew a prosecution 
witness. Both, however, stated that they could lay 
aside any feelings and render an impartial verdict 
based solely and squarely on the merits (Partial 
transcript p. 8) . 
As the jury was being polled as to their verdict, 
one juror had to be asked a question thrice before 
answering. He indicated that he did n0t hear very 
well (Partial transcript p. 11). Defeijise counsel, 
however, failed to object, make an exception, or 
question the juror to see if he had failed to hear 
any of the testimony. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A. THERE WAS NO ERROR COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
IN SUPERVISING JURY SELECTION. 
Appellant challenged two jurors for cause. The 
trial court denied the challenges. Appellant now 
appeals that decision. Respondent submits that the 
decision of the trial court should be affirmed for 
any one of four reasons. Firstf a trial judge necessarily 
has broad discretion in which to make decisions con-
cerning jury selection. Thus his judgment should be 
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given great weight by the appellate court. Secondf 
respondent submits that the trial judge acted 
correctly. Third, all of the questions raised on 
appeal concerning the possibility of a biased jury 
have already been answered negatively by the jurors 
themselves. Finally, appellant has not carried his 
burden on appeal in that he has failed to show that 
any actual prejudice resulted from the trial court 
decision. 
It should be first noted that a trial judge is 
granted broad discretion in handling a trial (Barber 
V. Calder, 522 P.2d 700 (Utah 1974), and particularly 
as he conducts the selection of a jury (State v. BeBee, 
110 Utah 484, 175 P.2d 478 (1946), State v. Narten, 
407 P.2d 81 99 Ariz. 116, cert, denied 384 U.S. 1008 
86 S.Ct. 1985, 16 L.Ed2d 1021 (1965)). The trial judge 
has the prime responsibility to determine facts and to 
judge the credibility of the statements made by prospec-
tive jurors (State v. Brosie, 540 P.2d 136, 24 Ariz. 
App. 517 (1975)1. The trial judge has the opportunity 
of seeing the jurors, hearing their answers to voir 
dire, and noting their manner and demeanor while under 
examination. Thus, he is m the best position to deter-
mine whether or not a challenge for cause is factually 
-4-
justified* It is much more hazardous for an appellate 
court to attempt to make such a determination. The 
trial court particularly should not be overruled in 
a case such as the instant one where the prospective 
jurors specficially answered all questions concerning 
prejudice with negative answers (State v. Barary 25 
Utah 2d 16, 474 P.2d 728 (1970)). There are certainly 
no "overwhelming reasons" (BeBee, supra) requiring 
reversal. In fact, the court's determination should 
not be overturned unless an abuse of discretion appears 
In re Minney' s Estate^ 216 Kan. 178, 531 P. 2d 52 
(1975), State v. Cutnose, 87 N.M. 300, 532 P.2d 889 
(1975), State v. Brose, supra, (Ariz. 1975)). This 
is particularly true in this case wher^ appellant 
failed to show any actual prejudice resulting from the 
lower court's decision (See discussion, infra p. 10 ). 
Second, respondent submits that there was no 
abuse of discretion by the trial judge under the law* 
Appellant complains that prospective juror Moore knew 
a prosecution witness. During voir dire it was estab-
lished: (1) That Moore lived down the street from the 
witness (P.T. p.2); (2) that Moore and the witness 
met occasionally at church activities (P.T» p.2); 
(3) that Moore would not give that witnesses* testimony 
any undue weight because of the relationship (P»T. p.2); 
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(4) that Moore might have some feelings that he would 
like to see the witness receive whatever was just 
under the facts (P.T. p.3); (5) that Moore could set 
the relationship aside and try the facts squarely OB 
the merits (P.T. p.8). (Moore was also asked if he 
would be comfortablef if he were the defendant, with 
a juror such as himself. He started to answer but 
was cut off by defense counsel (P.T. p.5). 
Appellant also complains that prospective 
juror Ward knew a prosecution witness. During voir 
dire it was established: (1) that Ward was a very 
good friend of the witness (P.T. p.3); (2) that Ward 
worked in a bank with the witnesses' wife {P.T. p.3)r 
(3) that Ward and the witness would occasionally visit 
in each other's homes (P.T. p.3); (4) that Ward's 
husband also knows the witness (P.T. p.3); (5) that 
Ward talked with the witness outside the courtroom 
before trial and without discussing anything at all 
about the case (P.T. p.6); (6) that Ward would be 
fair and would consider the facts (P.T. p.6); (7) 
that Ward would not give the witnesses' testimony any 
more validity than she would other witnesses (P.T. p.6); 
(8) that Ward would set the relationship aside and 
judge the case squarely on the merits without bias 
or prejudice (P.T. p.8). 
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Respondent submits that from the facts established 
through voir dire there is no legal balsis for a challenge 
for cause. Appellant would have prospective jurors 
excused simply because they were acquainted with a 
witness. This is not the law in Utah, and it is 
amply demonstrated by reference to the case of State 
v. Baran, 25 Utah 2d 16, 474 P.2d 728 (1970). Justice 
Callister, speaking for a unanimous Coiirt, said thats 
"Section 77-30-18, Utah Code Ann. 
1953, provides that a particular 
cause of challenge is: (1) for 
implied bias, and (2) actual bias, 
which is defined as a state of 
mind on the part of the juror which 
leads to a just inference tljtat he 
will not act with entire impartiality. 
Section 77-30-19, Utah Code Ann. 1953, 
enumerates the sole grounds upon 
which implied bias may be alleged, 
none of the grounds asserted by 
defendant falls within this catagory. 
Section 77-30-21, Utah Code Ann. 
19 53, provides: * * * In a challenge 
for actual bias the cause stated in 
section 77-30-18 (2) must be alleged; 
but no person shall be disqualified as 
a juror. . . provided it appears to 
the court, upon his declaration under 
oath or otherwise, that he can and will, 
notwithstanding such opinion, act 
impartially and fairly upon the matters 
submitted to hiitu (25 U.2d 16 at 19) . 
(Emphasis added). 
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As is evident from the foregoing language, 
appellant, to prevail, must either show implied bias 
or actual bias on the part of prospective jurors Ward 
and Moore. Section 77-30-19 lists the sole grounds 
allowed by lav; in Utah for implied bias. Nowhere does 
that section say that a person may be excused because 
he is acquainted with a witness. The rule on actual 
bias is given in 77-30-18(2). That section is likewise 
legally unavailable to appellant sinc€> it provides that 
no person may be disqualified if he will swear under 
oath that he will be impartial and fair, which both 
Moore and Ward did. Therefore, the trial court correctly 
ruled, under Utah law, on appellantfs challenges for 
cause. 
Respondent would further like to list some cases 
wherein actions similar to those of the trial court 
in the instant case were upheld. In C.R. Owens Trucking 
Corporation v. Stewart, 29 Utah 2d 353, 509 P.2d 821 
(1973) the Utah Supreme Court said: 
"At the conclusion of the 
examination counsel for the plaintiff 
challenged for cause nine members 
of the panel on the grounds that 
they were acquainted with the 
defendant and also on the basis 
they were [were in the same 
business]. . . the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in not re-
moving from the panel the jurors 
challenged." (29 U.2d at 355). 
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In State -. Brosie, 24 Ariz. App. 517, 540 P.2c 136 
(1975), the Arizona Court of Appeals said: 
"It is true that Mr. Roglers knew 
the prosecutor by sight. This how-
ever is insufficient to shota he was 
prejudiced. . .Mr. Rogers bpinion 
that police officers have bbtter 
access to facts is also insufficient 
to show prejudice, especially in view 
of his expressed willingness to 
follow the courts instructions and 
determine the credibility of each 
witness according to the raqts or 
the case." 540 P.2d at 140. 
See also Smithey v. State, Okl.Cr. 385 P.2d 920 (1963)» 
State v. Clayton, 109 Ariz- 587, 514 Pf2d 720 (1973), 
and In re Estate of Minne£/ 2 1 6 Kan- 178, 531 P.2d 
52 (1975), for the proposition that it is not proper 
grounds for a challenge for cause to simply allege, with-
out more, that a prospective juror simply knows a witness. 
Third, the questions raised on appeal concerning 
the possibility of a biased jury have already been 
answered negatively by the juror themselves. Appellant 
questions whether or not the two prospective jurors, 
Ward and Moore, could give "the same impartial consider-
ation to the testimony of all witnesses! appearing before 
the court." (appellant's brief, p. 13). Both answered 
that they could (P.T. p. 4/5,6). Appelllant also questions 
whether the two could set relationships aside and decide 
the case on the merits. Both testified they could 
(P.T. p.8). Obviously the trial court had no gounds 
for sustaining the challenges• 
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Finally, appellant has not carried his burden 
on appeal in that he has failed to show any actual 
prejudice resulting from the trial court decision. 
Neither Ward nor Moore actually sat on the jury in 
this case. Without a showing of prejudice, any 
error must be deemed harmless. (State v. Winkle, 
535 P.2d 82 (Utah 1975)). Appellant alleges that 
there was prejudice claiming that there is a 
possibility that he might have had a better jury if lie 
had not had to use his peremptories on Ward and Moore. 
He, in effect, asks this court to speculate as to 
what would have happened if the trial court had 
granted his challenges. Respondent submits, on the 
other hand, that the question before this court is 
simply: was appellant tried by an impartial jury. 
The issue is not whether he could have had a better jury 
or what would have happened if. . . . The Utah 
Supreme Court has said that it will not be convinced by 
"rebulous assertions without any substantial, believable 
or factual probative substance," such as those now 
made by appellant. (Mayne v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 195, 
468 P.2d 369 (1970)). 
Respondent submits that appellant has utterly 
failed to show any prejudice as a result of the jury 
that actually tried him. First, there is no claim 
by appellant that he used all of his peremptories. 
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(For example see State v. Brinkman, 6$ Utah 557, 
251 P. 364 (1926), and more recently, State v» 
Bautista, 30 Utah 2d 112, 514 P.2d 530 (1973), which is 
quoted infra. See also People v. Miller, 78 Cal.Rptr. 
449, 71 C.2d 459, 455 P.2d 377 (1969) and State v. 
Paxton, 201 Kan. 353, 440 P.2d 650 (1968). In both 
of these latter cases an appeal was m^de to the United 
States Supreme Court, however, certio^ary was denied 
as reported in 406 U.S. 971, 92 S.Ct. 2417, 32 L.Ed.2d 
672, and 393 U.S. 849, 89 S.Ct. 137, ^ 1 L.Ed.2d 120 
respectively. Further see People v» Simmons, 183 
Colo. 253, 516 P.2d 117 (1973), and sqott v. State, 
Okla.Crim. 538 P.2d 1061 (1975), as authority for the 
same point. 
Therefore, since there is no allegation that 
appellant used all his peremptories, t|his case is 
identical to State v. Bautista, supra.], wherein a 
defendant challenged a prospective jurpr which challenge 
was denied. When the issue was raised on appeal the 
Utah Supreme Court said: 
"No claim is made by the 
defendants that by reason of the 
court's failure to excuse tjhe 
prospective juror they were 
compelled to use a peremptory 
challenge they might have uped 
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to strike another prospective jurorfs 
name from the list." (514 P.2d at 532). 
Therefore the court went on: 
"Defendants fail to show that 
any prejudice resulted to them 
by reason of the court's failure 
to grant their challenge for cause." 
(Id.). 
Respondent submits that the Bautista decision is 
controlling. 
Secondly, there is no claim in appellant's appeal 
that any biased jurors actually sat on the jury, nor 
are there any facts that could conceivably be used 
to support such an allegation. Therefore, there 
is no showing of actual prejudice. Appellant has 
merely raised possibilities of hypothetical prejudice 
and thus his conviction should be affinned. 
B. APPELLANT HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO AN APPEAL 
BASED ON A JUROR'S ALLEGED DEAFNESS. 
Appellant would have this court reverse the 
conviction on the grounds that one of the jurors 
had an alleged hearing problem. Appellant cites 
one minor instance as his sole proof of this allegation. 
The court asked a question of one of the jurors. That 
juror asked to have the question repeated twice before 
he answered, saying "I don't hear too good." (P.T. p.11). 
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Respondent submits that there is no proof that 
the juror was incompetent or that he massed any 
testimony during the trial. The general rule is 
that a juror is not disqualified per s0 because of 
deafness (Saffran v. Meyer, 103 S.C. 3^6, 88 S.E. 3 
(1916), but only if the deafness is to such a degree 
that he didnft hear material testimony (Commonwealth v. 
Brown, Penn. 332 A.2d 828 (1974). In tjtie instant case 
there is no proof that the juror missed any material 
testimony. 
The burden is on appellant to proye that the 
juror was not competent to sit. This burden has not 
been carried. The rule is that any objections to a 
juror because of disqualification is waived by failure 
to object until after the verdict. (People v. Lewis, 
180 Colo. 423, 506 P.2d 125 (1973); Bear} v. State, 86 
Nev. 80, 465 P.2d 133 (1970), cert, denijed 400 U.S. 844, 
91 S.Ct. 89, 27 L.Ed.2d 81; Higgins v. Commonwealth, 
287 Ky. 767, 155 S.W.2d 209 (1941); Lind|sey v. State, 189 
Tenn. 355, 225 S.W.2d 533 (1949)). 
Since appellant failed to register an objection 
or exception at the time of the incident], and since 
appellant railed to ask any questions of the juror 
concerning whether or not he had any trouble hearing 
-13-
during the trial, appellant has failed to give this 
Court any basis for his claim of prejudice. There 
is, therefore, no grounds for reversal. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE APPELLANT IS SUFFICIENT 
TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT. 
Appellant argues on appeal that there was in-
sufficient evidence to convict him. Respondent 
submits first, that there is more than sufficient 
incriminating evidence, second, that appellant fails 
in his burden on appeal in this issue, third, that 
appellant is doing nothing more than arguing weight 
and credibility, which are both questions for the 
trier of fact. 
The prosecution put on two eye witnesses to 
establish that appellant was the man who robbed the 
store in Bountiful. Appellant, as his defense, called 
his girlfriend and another woman to testify that 
appellant was in Ogden at the time of the robbery. 
Therefore, the entire question in this case was which 
of the witnesses to believe. Appellant argues that 
since he had good alibi witnesses, that as a matter 
of law, this court must reverse. 
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Respondent submits that the test is found 
in the case of State v. Mills, (Utah 1&75), 530 
P. 2d 1272. The Utah Supreme Court the£e said: 
"For a defendant to prevail 
upon a challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence to sustain his con-
viction, it must appear tha-j: viewing 
the evidence and all inferences 
that may reasonably be drawn there-
from, in the light most favorable 
to the verdict of the jury, reason-
able minds could not believe him 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
To set aside a verdict it must 
appear that the evidence was so 
inconclusive or'unsatisfactory that 
reasonable minds acting fairly must 
have entertained reasonable doubts 
that defendant committed thQ crime." 
(530 P.2d 1272). 
Respondent further submits that as the evidence is 
examined in the light most favorable tc} the jury 
verdict, it becomes impressively obvious that the 
conviction should be sustained. 
The proprietor of the store was s|hown a group 
of six mug-shots on the day after the rjobbery. He 
very strongly indicated that a certain [photograph was 
of the man who robbed him. That was a photo of the 
appellant (T-20) . He said, "If that's hot him, its 
his twin brother." (Id). In addition, a customer 
m the store at the time of the robbery was shown the 
same photos on a separate occasion. He also picked 
out the picture of appellant (T-98). JEn addition 
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to this eyewitness evidence, there was other cir-
cumstantial evidence of guilt. Appellant put 
on an alibi witness that testified that she saw 
appellant in Ogden at the time of the robbery. 
The testimony of this witness was thoroughly discredited 
however by further testimony that a group of appellant's 
friends paid her a visit before trial and threatened 
her if she did not help appellant (T-260). Finally, 
although appellant had an alibi at trial, when he 
was arrested and questioned he did not, implying 
that the alibi was a fabrication (T-226-228) . 
Applying the law to this case, it is obvious 
that appellant has failed to show that the evidence 
was so "inconclusive and unsatisfactoiry" that 
reasonable people would not have convicted him. 
The jury simply, and with good reason, chose to 
believe the eyewitnesses rather than the alibi 
witnesses. Respondent submits that it was the jury's 
prerogative to resolve disputed testimony State v. 
Kelsey, (Utah 1975), 532 P.2d 1001. The rule is that 
when evidence conflicts, the judgment of the trier 
of facts as to the credibility of the witnesses is 
determinative, Stare v. Harris, 2 5 Utah 2d 3 65, 439 
P.2d 1008 (1971). The jury is in the best position 
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to do this, since they can see the witnesses, listen 
to their tone of voice, and note their manner and 
demeanor while being examined. Their determination 
of the facts should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Since there was no error in the nfanner in 
which the jury was selected, and since there was 
no prejudice as a result of the jury wl^ ich actually 
sat on this case, and further, since the evidence 
was sufficient to justify conviction, t|he verdict 
must stand. 
Respectfully (submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMJSIEY 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake Cit^, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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